Originally written for Wiley’s Oil and Energy Trends in July 2025.
(5200 words)
Trump’s tariffs and pro-fossil fuel energy policies, along with China’s massive success in low carbon energy are redefining the global energy landscape, which in turn will strongly influence the future of global geopolitics.
A global division in energy pathways is developing and likely to accelerate over coming years, influenced heavily by a country’s level of hydrocarbon resource endowment, trade policies and policy treatment of global warming. In general terms, China, northeast Asia, and Europe are – with varying levels of success – moving towards lower carbon (and indigenous) energy forms helped by Chinese manufacturing advances. Meanwhile, oil and gas rich North America and the Middle East/central Asia/Russia stick largely with hydrocarbons – reinforced now by US tariffs and trade bargaining. Battlegrounds are likely to be in countries like Pakistan, Philippines, Nigeria, Turkey and India, which could, at least partially, avoid heavier dependence on fossil fuels, as the costs of low carbon alternatives fall and their economies expand. The trend is not uniform (there’s a lot of solar going up in the Middle East, for example), and some areas of decarbonisation are doing better than others (with growing questions over green hydrogen in particular), but a definite trend has developed, which could determine the global energy landscape and help shape the geopolitics of the future.
Over the last two years several major events have reinforced rising global divisions in energy and environmental policy, which is increasingly leading to a two-tier approach to decarbonisation and climate change around the world. The schism could mean fundamental change for the oil and gas sector, as well as new opportunities for green technologies that together will help define future economic and geopolitical alliances.
China’s Green Revolution
Perhaps the most significant development is China’s massive success in driving production up and costs down in key low carbon sectors, especially solar, batteries and electric vehicles (EVs), which is showing that rapid expansion of green energy is possible alongside a healthy growing economy – which could lead many developing countries to reconsider their direction towards a conventional roll out of refineries and other hydrocarbon infrastructure.
China hit its ambitious 2030 renewables targets many years ahead of schedule, and in May alone, China installed 26GW of wind and a truly staggering 93GW of solar, leaving it with over 1000GW of solar capacity.1 Storage, nuclear and other low carbon sources are also being quickly expanded.
China is continuing to approve new coal fired capacity as well, with huge domestic coal reserves ticking its energy security box. But, while capacity is rising, the overall share of coal plants, along with plant utilisation rates, is falling quickly as renewable output soars and displaces coal and gas-fired generation – in May thermal generation in China hit a record low of 46% as new solar plants kicked in (1). In particular, older, less efficient, and more polluting coal plants are being pushed off the grid in some areas, helped by a nascent carbon emissions market.
To address the renewables intermittency issue in power generation, China is scaling lithium-ion battery technology, as well as looking at various alternative storage options. These include compressed air, thermal storage, pumped hydro, and sodium batteries. In 2024 alone, China added 42 GW of energy storage, bringing total capacity to 74 GW – the largest globally. The country has also begun construction of the world’s largest compressed air energy storage (CAES) plant, with 1050 MW / 4200 MWh capacity, which is expected to deliver 1.4bn kWh annually for grid balancing at 65%+ efficiency.
On the transport front, battery technology is coming on in leaps and bounds led by the world’s biggest producer, CATL, driving costs down to below $50/KWh, improving energy densities and leading to the potential development of EVs with ranges of up to 1500km, as well as flying EVs. The advances have convinced Chinese consumers, with EVs making up over half of all car sales in China since late last year, a share that is expected to keep on rising2 – with significant impact on gasoline and diesel demand.
The momentum is now carrying over to heavy-duty trucks and other commercial vehicles, which (alongside a switch to LNG) will further reduce diesel demand. According to Energy Intelligence, new energy vehicles made up over 22% of China’s heavy truck sales in 1H 2025, up from around 9% last year. In May, CATL said it expects over half of all heavy-duty truck sales will be electric by 2028 thanks to fierce domestic competition and supportive policies.3
China is electrifying all its energy sectors quickly, with strong progress in transport, heating, and cooking, as well as power supply. All the growth in green energy is retained within China’s domestic economy, with none leaking abroad in the form of regular fuel imports as is the case with oil and gas – which has turned low carbon technologies into a major growth engine.
China has also successfully established domestic supply chains for rare earth metals essential for some green technologies, which are now a major global strategic asset and foreign currency earner in themselves. In 2024, clean energy sectors accounted for a record 10% of China’s GDP and drove a quarter of the country’s growth, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.4
Gasoline and diesel consumption is already falling in China, and total oil consumption – which had been driving global oil demand growth since 2005 – is now expected to peak in China in 2027 according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), two years earlier than previously forecast. Given China is the world’s biggest importer, the IEA says this will mark a fundamental transformation of the global energy market.5 Extensive high-speed rail is helping to displace oil use, alongside gas-fuelled trucks, EVs and other electrification. The IEA’s 2025 estimate of China’s 2030 oil demand is down by 1mn b/d y-o-y (1% of global consumption).
The decline in oil demand is evident in falling oil imports and record high stocks. In May Chinese crude imports reached a four-month low of 11mn b/d, 0.8% below the same month in 2024, despite low prices when China tends to buy more, although levels showed signs of picking up in July. May also saw the country’s onshore inventory hit a record high of 1.175bn barrels. Globally, oil prices are under pressure from lower-than-expected demand growth linked to China’s green revolution.
The rising use of solar, wind, other renewables, EVs and other electrification means China’s carbon emissions may have plateaued – a significant moment for the world given China is the world’s biggest emitter (30% in 2023 compared to 12% for the US).6 They fell Q1 this year for the first time, suggesting they may have peaked last year despite rising power demand and steady economic growth.7
The US switch-back to hydrocarbons
The second major factor driving a division in global energy systems is the MAGA Republicans’ rise to power in the US, which has led to a repeal of Biden-era decarbonisation policies, including Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) tax credits for solar and wind farms, alongside the introduction of supportive policies for hydrocarbons and a raft of protectionist tariffs – making green options more expensive.
The green subsidy roll backs were passed as part of Donald Trump’s “big, beautiful bill” on July 3. In a recent report,8 Wood Mackenzie said most wind and solar credits would be delayed or abolished and estimated that the green energy sector would lose about $500bn of tax credits over the next 10 years, citing Tax Foundation data.9
To qualify, wind and solar projects must now enter service by the end of 2027 or start construction by 4 July 2026 and enter service by the end of 2030. This has been restricted further by tightening the definition of ‘under construction’ in response to pressure from House Republicans who vehemently oppose the technologies. The administration has also imposed wide restrictions on the involvement of foreign entities from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, in projects – including imported components – which Woodmac sees as a real issue in some areas.
Enverus estimates that only 30% of US solar and 57% of wind projects are expected to survive. Investment in wind and solar power is expected to fall well short (100GW from 2025 – 2030) of what it would have been if the IRA incentives had remained in place, according to Woodmac, although it adds that installations will continue to be supported by growing electricity demand, state and corporate policies, and competitive costs in some areas.
According to Kayrros data, a slowdown in the roll out of solar began straight after the election in November last year, as oil and gas companies pulled back and others began slowing projects in anticipation of reduced support.10 By January this year, the rate had almost halved versus year-earlier levels, according to Kayrros, which could lead to supply shortfalls as US demand strengthens due to additional AI and electrification demand.
However, unlike solar and wind, other low-carbon energy technologies that are dispatchable rather than intermittent, including battery storage, geothermal and nuclear, will all retain full tax credit eligibility for construction beginning up to the end of 2033, 75% in 2034, 50% in 2035 and 0% from 2036. Even so, the foreign entity rules are likely to restrict battery projects in particular. Carbon Capture and Storage also retains credits, with a focus on enhanced oil recovery.
In addition, the Trump administration has removed many restrictions on upstream hydrocarbon developments (see June Focus), including fewer regulations, lower royalties, more licensing rounds and a promised revival for coal – although the US EIA was still predicting in July that the total operating capacity of US coal-fired power plants would fall from 172 GW in May 2025 to 145 GW by the end of 2028.11
A repeal of environmental protection rules, including fuel efficiency mandates, is also underway, which could cut the average mile per gallon performance of new cars, helping push up fuel demand and increase tailpipe emissions. All support for EVs and charging infrastructure is being dropped. Attempts by California and other greener US states to maintain environmental laws are also being challenged by the Federal government.
Together the policies are pushing back against conventional wisdom on global warming and driving a sharp wedge between the US and the policies of most other developed and many developing nations, as well as the UN and other international bodies. The administration has no policy to address rising levels of greenhouse gases.
Tariffs compound domestic energy legislation.
At the same time, the imposition of tariffs by the US on imported goods from China and elsewhere will increase the price of green projects and technologies and restrict availability in some areas due to China’s dominance of many low carbon technologies, components and raw materials. Tariffs on steel and aluminium will also push up project costs, although this will affect fossil fuel projects as well and can more easily be covered domestically.
However, it is unclear if the Trump administration wants to develop a domestic US low carbon technology manufacturing sector to replace imports (as appears to be the aim of tariffs in other sectors), with domestic policy so openly hostile in some areas. In fact, in some cases companies are divesting from low carbon investments despite the protective tariffs. For example, General Motors has ended plans to make electric motors at a factory near Buffalo and instead will put $888m into building large gasoline engines.
The situation is likely to increase US reliance on oil and gas and slow progress towards a lower carbon economy, which had already been patchy across the US. In its latest annual report, the IEA estimated the US would consume 1.1mn b/d more gasoline by 2030 as a result of the new policies and lower prices.12
Wider influence
The impact of these events is not restricted to China or the US. With Trump’s trade policies tied to trade balances, the US administration is also indirectly putting pressure on trading partners to buy its hydrocarbon exports, especially LNG, helping lock in use of the fuel across a wider range of countries.
For example, Trump is pressing Japan and South Korea to invest heavily in Alaska’s proposed LNG export plant and sign long term supply deals. And his trade deal with the EU in late July included a commitment to buy $750bn of US LNG and other energy over just three years, although analysts say this is unlikely to happen in practise – a similar deal with China in 2020 fell well short of the $50bn promised over two years.13
As well as reciprocal trade deals, the US may have a problem dealing with proposed carbon taxes around the world, in particular Europe’s plans for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) – designed to add costs to energy intensive product imports that have not been produced to the same clean energy standards as in the EU and UK.
The Trump administration is unlikely to react positively to CBAM imposition and may well use such tariffs as an excuse for more tariffs of its own. However, other countries aiming for net zero may adopt a similar approach to the EU as they attempt to protect domestic industries burdened by higher environmental costs. The US may come under pressure if a large portion of the world shuns its high carbon footprint goods and services.
China’s sphere
On the other hand, it is those countries with good relations or open trading policies with China that are best positioned to accelerate development of their green energy sectors, as it is China that currently produces the lowest cost green manufactured goods.
As well as significant direct exports, Chinese companies are expanding overseas, building EV and battery factories in multiple countries, including the UK, Brazil, Türkiye, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Morocco, and Hungary. Climate Energy Finance says over $168bn has been invested overseas by China’s green energy giants since the start of 2023 (see map 1).
Tariff-free imports of Chinese cars, solar panels, and batteries, as well as inward investment by advanced Chinese green tech companies, means such countries have a clear cost advantage in achieving energy transition goals and greater energy security. For example, the UK (which has no tariffs on Chinese EVs apart from a standard 10% duty on all non-EU vehicles), has seen sales of EVs rise by a third in 1H 2025 as BYD and other Chinese companies begin marketing competitive EV models in the UK market14 – pushing the country towards its target of 28% EV sales this year, helped by additional subsidies announced in mid-July.
However, this open approach also runs the risk of becoming more dependent on Chinese imports and investment, and more locked into Chinese influence.
Map 1
Source: Climate Energy Finance
Even where there are significant tariffs on Chinese EVs, as in the EU, improved models are boosting sales. In 1H 2025 EV sales in Germany reached a record high of around 20% of total sales, after slow growth for 2-3 years. In the EU more widely, EV sales have also risen significantly so far this year despite total car sales falling, according to the European Automobile Manufacturer’s Association.
Spreading carbon reduction
According to Carbon Brief, China’s exports of clean-energy technologies are increasingly helping to cut emissions in other countries. It said that such exports in 2024 alone have cut 1% from global emissions outside of China.15 The global CO2 savings from using these products for just one-year acts to more than outweigh the emissions from manufacturing them and, in total, will avoid some 4bn tonnes of CO2 over the lifetimes of the products.
In addition, they improve energy security in economies dependent on imported fossils fuels. This is further encouraging Asian economies – many of which are heavily import dependent – to follow China. Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia are rapidly electrifying, according to an Ember report cited by Bloomberg, building out their manufacturing sectors for basic grid equipment, such as transformers and cables. Others including India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka are rapidly increasing solar and wind power’s share of the grid mix.16
Ember says electrification is critical for countries looking to grow their economies, increasing efficiency and lowering costs of operation, as well as being some of the fastest growing sectors themselves.
In Türkiye, another key growing economy with little domestic oil and gas, solar generation recently exceeded gas-fired output for the first time, while new nuclear capacity is set to come online within months. The country is also advancing utility-scale battery storage, aiming for 80 GWh by 2030 to support renewable integration against a background of rapid demand growth.
China is now the biggest trading partner for most of these developing countries (see map 2), which in theory gives it more leverage to influence policy. But inertia towards a fossil fuel-based economy is strong in some countries, while others remain keen to develop their own hydrocarbon reserves, and see oil and gas development as a route to wider economic prosperity. This view could be changing as China’s achievements filter out, while its green exports keep improving in quality and falling in price, and extreme weather events continue to worsen.
Map 2
Source: US customs, Eurostat, Chinese customs, https://www.econovis.net/
There are also barriers to renewables’ uptake and high subsidies for fossil fuels in some countries, which are deterring a switch to green options. Many governments still apply full import duties and VAT on low carbon energy goods — raising end-user prices by up to 40%. These fiscal barriers make solar unaffordable for millions of households in developing countries, slowing progress on energy access and rural development, according to GOGLA (the global association for the off-grid solar energy industry).17
GOGLA estimates show that removing fiscal barriers could unlock tens of thousands of new jobs in Africa in sales, financing, assembly, and installation of solar systems – whilst also saving money on fossil fuel subsidies.
Divided along hydrocarbon endowment lines.
Based on progress so far and outlook, it is oil and gas reserves, rather than environmental concerns or wealth, that appears, in a rather self-interested way, to be the most important driver shaping most governments/populations’ attitudes to rising CO2 levels and the threat of global warming. This focus links to economic and national security concerns and may also be influenced by the level of renewables potential – which varies significantly – and key allies and trading partners such as the US and China.
Opting for fossils fuels fails to address the problem of greenhouse gas emissions, but it is hardly surprising, given what is at stake and how much certain countries and groups have to lose.
The rise of China’s green economy, combined with its increasing influence overseas puts global hydrocarbon demand at risk – which is a direct challenge to the major oil producing countries, especially the big exporters in the Middle East and Former Soviet Union, as well as major oil companies.
The oil demand question.
China’s renewables expansion makes the IEA’s peak oil demand forecast of 2030 far more likely, while undermining OPEC’s forecast that demand will keep growing to 120mn b/d by 2050. The IEA sees global demand increasing by about 2.5mn b/d to plateau at around 105.5mn b/d by 2030, with annual demand growth slowing from recent typical levels of about 1-2% per year.
The IEA and OPEC are increasingly polarized in their oil market outlooks, with OPEC accusing the IEA of jeopardizing energy security by putting off investors in the oil sector with its low-ball forecasts. In 2024, the IEA’s demand growth forecast was half that of OPEC and proved to be much more accurate, with demand growing by about 700,000 b/d. OPEC expects global crude demand to rise by 1.3mn b/d in 2025, compared with the IEA’s prediction of just 650,000 b/d, largely due to lower oil for power burning in the Middle East, a demand slowdown in China and EV penetration more widely, according to its June oil market report.18
With the Trump administration’s switch to favour fossil fuels in the US, the IEA expects gasoline consumption to fall by a lower amount – down from 1.6mn b/d by 2030 in earlier forecasts to 790,000 b/d. But China’s renewables success means the IEA expect it to consume 1.4mn b/d less oil in 2030 than previous forecast, at just 16.7mn b/d.
Gas squeezed by solar; upside from grid balancing.
Similarly, large volumes of potential LNG demand are likely to be displaced by solar and batteries, especially in Asia – the fuel’s main growth region. This could leave significant volumes of future LNG production unplaced, with the International Group of LNG Importers (GIIGNL) estimating that LNG liquefaction capacity is expected to grow by 37% to over 672.1mn mt/yr by 2028.19 Of this, some 71mnt/yr is being built in the US, 33 mnt/yr in Qatar and 19 mnt/yr in Canada.
The trajectory of global LNG demand is now marked by “deep uncertainty,” according to the French president of the GIIGNL.20 He said in May that, although long-term fundamentals remained strong, short-to-medium-term demand projections are increasingly difficult to pin down due to volatile pricing, geopolitical fragmentation, and uneven economic recoveries in key Asian markets. GIIGNL’s annual report also showed that while demand did grow in 2024, it was very modest, rising to 405mn t, up just 3mnt from 401mn t in 2023.
However, as governments tackle grid limitations, a stronger consensus has developed around gas’s role as a “bridge fuel” to maintain baseload power supply, according to the UK’s Energy Institute. China, however, is also importing more by pipeline from Russia and has increased domestic production to become the world’s fourth largest gas producer – as well as ramping up renewables.
Nevertheless, China remains the world’s biggest crude and LNG importer. This strategic weakness almost certainly contributed to driving China towards renewables and may encourage others to buy its green exports while also developing their own green energy sectors. Big Eurasian importers, such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, face similar energy security and import cost issues, along with big importers from developing Asia, such as India, Philippines, Turkey, Thailand and Vietnam.
On-going threats to Middle East oil and gas supply, as seen recently with Israel’s attacks on Iran (as well as frequent extreme weather events) are keeping up the pressure to switch. Japan is particularly vulnerable to Mideast oil supply disruption, with over 95% of its 2.3mn b/d imports in 2024 originating in the Mideast, according to Energy Intelligence. That falls to 72% for South Korea and 35-40% for India.
The high level of import dependence means national energy security considerations align closely with environmental concerns over global warming. A lack of hydrocarbon reserves would no longer be an issue if a cost competitive green energy system could be set up to replace imports.
A new geopolitical order
Global geopolitics have for 80 years been centred around the Middle East and access to oil. In the developing scenario, green-orientated countries would no longer have this imperative but could become more reliant on imports and investment from China – the manufacturing source of key low carbon assets, especially solar panels, EVs, batteries and rare earth metals essential for manufacturing advanced components (although technological advances are reducing the need for rare earths in some areas).
However, the dependence is less onerous in several respects. Once bought, these assets are useable and recyclable without a constant reliance on fuel imports, so the relationship would be more nuanced than that with a constant supplier like OPEC+. And provided the raw materials are available in international markets to make them, domestic manufacturing can be developed outside China, preventing too heavy a dependence. Inward investment is also an option, as Chinese companies are already doing in many countries (see above). In any case, a large portion of the costs involved in wind and solar energy are in asset installation, which are largely retained within national boundaries.
The price of renewable options is also not inflated by a cartel, in the way that OPEC+ supports the oil price. Quite the opposite; China has created such a conducive domestic business environment that oversupply has developed among the many large producers of solar panels, EVs and other green technologies. This has driven down prices for key renewable assets through intense competition and innovation – leaving many domestic companies making a loss. This is also making it difficult for any foreign competition to get established, at least in countries open to tariffless Chinese imports. This is used as partial justification for tariffs on Chinese EVs and solar panels in the EU and elsewhere.
While this set-up will benefit China as an exporter overall, it is unlikely to maintain the type of steady wealth flow from oil/energy poor to oil rich countries that have been seen over the last 60 years. Provided countries have access to renewable energy sources like wind and solar (some, including perhaps Germany, may fall short in this area), this can mean a far greater degree of energy independence for those without large hydrocarbon endowments – which will mean less global dependence on the Middle East and a slow erosion of the old pillars of geopolitics.
Fossil fuels are location-bound and finite; clean technologies are replicable. Oil and gas reserves cannot be engineered, unlike batteries, solar panels, and critical mineral supply.
The future is mostly green.
The pendulum already appears to be swinging in favour of green technologies at a global level, despite the latest US policies. On cost, a report by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), found that the average cost of solar power was 41% lower than the cheapest fossil fuel options last year, while onshore wind energy was 53% cheaper.21 Around 91% of renewable energy projects commissioned last year were cheaper than fossil fuels, according to the study.
UN Secretary General António Guterres said the news meant a clean energy future was inevitable and that any countries focused on fossil fuels were not protecting their economies but sabotaging them.
According to the UK-based Energy Institute, wind and solar demand growth far outstripped all other energy sources in 2024, jumping 16% year over year and dwarfing a 1% increase in fossil fuel use. However, it said success in China may have masked slower progress in other regions such as Europe as energy security concerns have risen up the agenda there, diluting the focus on decarbonisation. The EI also noted that fossil fuels still dominated in 2024 making up 87% of the global energy mix, so while the balance may be tipping, there is still a long way to go.
Sales of EVs are growing rapidly. Most EVs in China are now cheaper than their internal combustion engine equivalents. This is expected to expand into other markets, with many cheaper electric models are planned for launch outside China this year and next, enabled by battery cells around $50/kWh or less. Global EV sales reached record levels in 2024, with some 17mn vehicles sold, two-thirds of them to customers in China. That could rise to around 22mn in 2025.22 By contrast, with shortages of equipment and people due to tariffs and immigration policy, the situation in the US is becoming more difficult for EV growth.
Meanwhile, sales of combustion engine cars are in decline, with global sales down a quarter from their 2017 peak. BloombergNEF’s latest outlook suggests ICE sales could fall about 30 % more by 2027.
Follow the money
The IEA said June 5 that about two thirds of energy investment would go to green energies in 2025, and just a third to fossil fuels. It said energy security concerns had pushed total global energy investment in 2025 up to a record $3.3 trillion (up 2% on 2024), with $2.2 trillion going to clean technologies. The high spending on clean technologies, including renewables, nuclear, grids, electrification, and low emission fuels, reflects what the IEA calls the “Age of Electricity”.
The IEA expects spending on oil to fall for the first time since the pandemic in 2020,23 with a drop in oil capex of 6% in 2025, as part of the $1.1 trillion spent on fossil fuels – as a result of sluggish prices and weakness in global demand.
The rise in green investment comes despite a retreat by international energy majors — particularly bp, Equinor and Shell — from low-emissions technologies, with a 25% dip in investment in 2024 and a further 10% expected this year. Other oil companies, such as Middle Eastern state companies including the UAE’s ADNOC and Saudi Aramco, as well as Petronas and Sinopec, have increased spending, according to the IEA.
Low prices mean US shale oil and gas investment could drop by 10% in 2025, while global investment gravitates towards the Middle East where the biggest and cheapest reserves exist. The IEA said refinery investment would fall to its lowest level in 10 years at roughly $30bn, resulting in no net capacity addition in 2025, due to increasing refinery retirements and a drop in new additions.
China is set to be the largest energy investor by far, the report notes, accounting for more than a quarter of total spending, while Africa continues to struggle to attract investment. The solar sector is expected to be the biggest single clean technology recipient with $450bn in 2025, driven by China, while nuclear power spending should hit $75bn, having grown by 50% in the past five years. Investment in grids, though strong at $400bn/yr, is failing to keep pace with spending on generation and electrification, the IEA said.
Outside Asia, much of the world’s future growth will come from Africa. While African countries are still keen to develop their significant oil and gas reserves, the continent holds more than 60% of the world’s best solar resources, as well as large deposits of key minerals needed for green technologies – which might be a better focus for development.
Many of the early teething problems with renewables, batteries and EVs have been ironed out over recent years, improving the technologies significantly. However, they remain in the early stages of development with plenty of potential for further improvement over coming decades – unlike the fossil fuel-based systems that have been fine-tuned for over a century. Given how closely matched the two are already, green technologies are likely to win out longer term.
Moral high ground
As global warming progresses and more extreme weather events take place, the US’ rejection of low carbon energy is likely to present it in an increasingly negative light, while China’s pioneering of cheap green energy is increasingly lauded as a global saviour.
Already, China can point to major reductions in CO2 emissions around the world (see map 3) as a result of its exports (as well as its own late start and dramatic progress), and with recent international legal decisions opening the way for countries to sue if emissions targets are not met, its ethical position is becoming stronger by the day.
China’s lead in green technologies and deployment is huge and growing, bringing down costs around the world. But oil and gas remain cheap, especially for those that have large and easily accessible reserves and will be hard to displace from these countries.
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Map 3
References
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