(Originally written for Wiley’s Oil and Energy Trends journal, end-April 2025)
US tariffs and other sanctions, along with the response from China, are threatening economic growth, softening energy demand expectations and reducing prices, as well as rearranging some key global trade flows and undermining upstream investment. The biggest trade impact is within North America and on flows from the US to China, affecting LNG, crude oil and especially petrochemical feedstocks. Penalties on Chinese shipping docking in the US, and other sanctions on Iran and Venezuela complicate the picture further.
The US under President Donald Trump imposed a series of import tariffs and sanctions on most other countries through late March and into April – which were reciprocated by China and to a lesser extent Canada, leading to fears of a global trade war. The tariffs were focused on the US’s biggest trading partners with the largest trade deficits, including Canada and Mexico as well as China, along with tougher sanctions on countries such as Iran and Venezuela. The tariffs appear to be largely aimed at tackling US trade imbalances, especially with China – the US imported $439bn from China last year, compared with exports of $143.5bn. But President Trump is also claiming that they will act as a major revenue source for the US government that could lead to lower income tax.
The situation is expected to cause a global economic slowdown along with inflationary pressures in the US, and possible deflation elsewhere, leading to lower oil and gas demand – causing a significant fall in oil prices. In its mid-April World Economic Outlook, the IMF said that the global economy would grow just 2.8% this year, down from its forecast in January of 3.3%.1 And in 2026, it forecasts global growth at 3%, down 0.3% from its previous estimate. The US is expected to be hit hardest, with JPMorgan raising the chances of an imminent US recession to 60% in April. The US Federal Reserve has also forecast that US growth will weaken this year, to 1.7%, down sharply on 2024.
Erratic imposition
The imposition of US tariffs through March and April has been erratic. Initial tariffs on Canada and Mexico in early March were postponed until April 2 and levied at 10% on energy exports from Canada and 25% for Mexico, while China imposed 10% tariffs on US oil and 15% on US LNG imports from February 10. A blanket 25% tariff was also imposed by the US on imports of cars and metals such as aluminium and steel, which is likely to raise upstream costs in the US – leading service companies, Halliburton and Schlumberger, have both warned of weaker North America oilfield activity as a result of higher tariff-related costs and lower prices.2
This was followed by President Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs in early April on a wide range of countries at varying levels, although these did not apply to oil and gas, and were quickly retracted for 90 days and replaced with a blanket 10% levy – on all countries apart from China, which reacted to the initial US tariffs with reciprocal levies. After several tit-for-tat moves, this ended with 145% US tariffs on Chinese goods, and 125% tariffs on all goods from the US to China, plus the extra 10% for oil and 15% for gas imposed in February. This left tariffs at 135% on crude imports and China’s substantial imports of US petrochemical feedstocks such as ethane and LPG, as well as halting US LNG imports with tariffs of 140%.
If the tariffs remain, it is likely to mean the end of energy flows from the US to China, with all term cargoes needing to find alternative buyers, while Chinese importers seek replacement cargoes. It is also likely to end Chinese support for US LNG export terminals and could cause hesitation among other overseas investors given the higher levels of policy risk and import tariffs – Woodside has already said its new Louisiana LNG export plant may need to be delayed, with up to half of all equipment imported to the US.3
On the other hand, bilateral investment deals may be done to avoid higher tariffs, with Japan and South Korea being encouraged to back Alaska LNG.4
In addition, the US threatened any country importing Venezuelan oil with a 25% tariff from April 2 – current buyers are dominated by Chinese independent refiners, as well as smaller volumes to India and Cuba, along with Malaysia, where ship to ship transfers are reportedly taking place. Tighter US sanctions on Iran are also likely to impact flows to China and other Asian buyers, although so far exports appear to be holding up (see below).
On top of all this, President Trump signed an executive order aimed at increasing orders for US built shipping by levying multi-million-dollar port docking fees on Chinese-built or Chinese-flagged tankers – which currently dominate the sector – and other vessels. This could make all tanker flows into the US more expensive, hitting refinery competitiveness, exports and adding to upward pressure on US product prices and downward pressure on US crude grades.
Looking ahead, President Trump could reimpose the higher Liberation Day tariffs after 90 days at the beginning of July if he is not satisfied with the outcome of trade negotiations with countries around the world, which could include them buying more US energy exports.
Currently, financial markets are pricing in a largely successful resolution to the situation, albeit with a heightened level of uncertainty especially around China-US. But if higher tariffs were to be reimposed more widely, the hit to the global economy, oil trade and demand is likely to be even more significant. Wood Mackenzie said that lower global GDP growth stemming from Trump’s initial tariff position could reduce 2026 oil demand by about 1mn b/d and prices by $7/bl beyond current forecasts to $64/bl for Brent.5
Further authoritarian moves from the Trump administration, especially with regard to the US Federal Reserve and interest rates, would also intensify the economic impact and heighten disruption, raising questions over the stability of the US dollar, with Fed independence central to US economic growth and stability.
Impact on global oil prices and demand
The imposition of tariffs and other sanctions, followed by a higher-than-expected OPEC-plus production hike, caused one of the largest falls in global oil prices of the last 30 years in early April.
The main Brent crude futures benchmark fell by around $15/bl or 20% in the week to April 9 in response to fears over weaker economic and oil demand growth, with the front month Brent contract dipping below $60/bl for the first time since January 2021. This was comparable to the falls after Covid-19 and the Russia/Saudi price war, and the 2008 financial crisis. In local currency terms the oil price falls were even greater due to weakness in the US dollar, which fell significantly through April on concerns over the US economy.
Crude prices then edged back up through mid-April, only to fall back again following attacks by President Trump on Jerome Powell, head of the US Federal Reserve. Levels then stabilised towards the end of the month in the mid-$60s/bl as Trump halted his attacks on Powell and said he was working towards a trade deal with China, although the Chinese denied any talks had taken place.
The lower prices are expected to persist this year, with the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) lowering its annual Brent forecast to $68/bl, down $6/bl on its previous forecast.6 Most banks also cut their crude price outlooks for 2025, reducing Brent forecasts for the year by $5-15/bl, and the US benchmark WTI by a similar amount.
The price falls came as a result of a downgrading in oil demand expectations, resulting from reduced trade and lower growth. S&P Global Platts estimated that oil/liquids demand growth would be about 500,000 b/d lower in 2025, leaving the upside at less than 750,000 b/d.7 Platts added on April 11 that it could not rule out a period of zero growth given the extreme volatility and uncertainty around US trade policy and possible retaliation.
Other forecasters also cut demand outlooks and prices for 2025 and 2026. In April, the US EIA cut its outlook for 2025 by 410,000 b/d to 900,000 b/d and for 2026 by 100,000 b/d to 1.0mn b/d. The EIA added that uncertainty over policy and GDP growth meant these forecasts also came with a “higher-than-normal level of uncertainty”. OPEC also lowered its forecast for 2025 and 2026 by 150,000 b/d to 1.3mn b/d in 2025 and 1.28mn b/d in 2026 – still above most other forecasts. The International Energy Agency (IEA) cut its more modest 2025 growth forecast by 300,000 b/d to 730,000 b/d.
OPEC-plus moves
The market weakness was exacerbated by OPEC-plus’s decision to release part of the 5.8mn b/d of crude it has withheld from the market since mid-2023. On April 3, after confirming they would start winding down the cuts, the eight producers involved said they would increase output by 411,000 b/d in May, rather than the earlier plan of 137,000 b/d.
However, following the price slump in early April, tougher compensation plans for over-production were also announced, by Iraq, Kazakhstan, and five other OPEC-plus members, amounting to 222,000 b/d in April, 378,000 b/d in May, and continuing into 2026. Previous compensation cut pledges have not been honoured, but the move still helped provide some support to markets mid-month, while the anticipated US crackdown on Venezuelan and Iranian exports was also supportive.
Nevertheless, prices only recovered to the mid-$60s, which is well below many oil producers’ breakeven levels and is significantly below the estimated fiscal breakeven prices of most OPEC-plus members. The lower prices mean many oil producing countries will incur budget deficits and spending cuts, including Russia.
Soon after taking office in January, President Trump suggested that $50/bl oil was a favourable price target that would lower pump prices for consumers and help persuade Russian President Putin (who is heavily dependent on oil revenues) to do a deal over Ukraine. However, such a low price is at odds with his plans to boost US oil and gas production, with US oil and gas producers unlikely to “drill, baby, drill” at that level. A price in the mid-$60s still puts pressure on Russia and cuts prices for consumers, while also retaining some profitability for US shale producers.
Nevertheless, the lower prices are likely to have a negative impact on investment in US shale, which responds quickly to price signals and is facing higher costs due to sanctions, as well as undermining more marginal longer-term projects elsewhere. On April 8, S&P Global said that US crude prices of $50/bl could cause US onshore oil production to drop by more than 1mn b/d over 12 months. US benchmark WTI was around $63/bl at the time of writing (end-April).
Impact on trade flows
In terms of oil trade, the first countries to be affected were US neighbours, Canada and Mexico. On April 2, the US imposed a 25% tariff on all imports from Mexico, and a 10% tariff on energy imports from Canada. Mexico has not responded but Canada has, although its reciprocal tariffs on the US are directed at a range of goods not including energy and are unlikely to affect the small volumes moving from the US to Canada.
As discussed in last month’s Focus, Canada is by far the largest exporter of oil and gas to the US (see table). Canadian oil and gas are normally sold at discounts to international prices due to their proximity and lack of alternative outlets, which has helped the US develop a highly competitive refining sector based around cheap and secure feedstock supplies.
US imports of Canadian crude by region in January (mn b/d)
| Midwest | 2.9 |
| West Coast | 0.51 |
| Gulf Coast | 0.45 |
| Rockies | 0.26 |
| Atlantic Coast | 0.16 |
| Total | 4.3 |
Source: US EIA
The 10% US tariff on imports from Canada is not expected to be steep enough to change these crude flows, because they are not easily redirected or replaced. US refineries with coking units are designed to process Canadian heavy crude rather than light sweet US shale grades, and there is no capacity to pump heavy alternatives from the US Gulf Coast. Flows of Canadian crude to the region had been on the rise, with Enbridge working on a 300,000 b/d expansion to its Mainline crude oil system in response to growing demand as far south as the US Gulf Coast.8
Similarly, Canadian producers are heavily dependent on US buyers, with very few alternative outlets – apart from the Trans Mountain Crude pipeline to the Pacific coast, which is operating at full capacity and could see volumes expanded.
The main question then is who pays the additional tariff cost. For heavily dependent US refinery buyers in the US Midwest and the US Rockies, reports in Platts suggest tariffs are likely to be shared between the refinery and the Canadian crude producer. This is likely to reverse any advantage the refiners had from lower Canadian prices and could mean downward pressure on refinery margins and upward pressure on regional product prices. Platts also reported a narrowing of discounts for Canadian grades against WTI.
On the US West Coast, refiners are more part of the Pacific market and therefore better able to shift from Canadian grades to alternative heavy grades that can be imported by sea from countries including Brazil, Iraq, Guyana, Ecuador and Argentina. This should dilute the impact for US refiners and consumers in the area.
On the Atlantic coast, the smaller amount of Canadian crude imports may also face more competition from alternative seaborne grades. Canada also supplies refined products to the US, especially the Atlantic Coast, so tariffs could boost prices and draw in more imports from Europe – which are not covered by Trump’s blanket 10% Liberation Day tariff. US imports of Canadian refined products averaged 720,000 b/d in January, according to the EIA, most of which was delivered to the Atlantic coast.
Mexico and the Gulf
The more significant 25% tariff on crude imports from Mexico is likely to cause a shift in flows as US refiners seek cheaper heavy crude supplies from South America, Iraq or even Canada. However, higher Mexican and Canadian prices are likely to push up differentials for suitable alternative grades, which could squeeze US Gulf Coast refining margins and push up product prices – eroding competitiveness in what is perhaps the most competitive refining centre in the world. US heavy grade Mars premium to WTI has risen, according to Platts, as have Latin American heavy grades.
The situation will be exacerbated as key alternative heavy grade imports from Venezuela will not be an option for the US starting in late May, and earlier on April 2 for any country wishing to avoid the 25% import tariffs associated with importing Venezuelan oil. The US imported 245,000 b/d of heavy crude from Venezuela in January through Gulf ports, according to the EIA. US imports of Mexican crude averaged 343,000 b/d in January, as well as significant quantities of other Mexican refinery feedstock and oil products, most of which are likely to flow elsewhere.
So far Mexico has not imposed retaliatory tariffs on the US. If it does, this could affect the 1.2mn b/d or so of refined products sold to Mexico, as well as US gas exports of 7bn ft3/d via pipeline to Mexico.
Pressure on US allies from tariffs has also increased demand for US crude in some areas, with US exports to India in February hitting their highest volumes in more than two years, jumping from 221,000 b/d in 2024 to 357,000 b/d in February, according to Kpler data reported in Oil Price.9
According to reports in Platts, Asian refiners are hoping for better offers for Mexican and Canadian grades as a result of the US tariffs, with more oil from both countries potentially flowing west across the Pacific.
China hits back
China’s reciprocal tariffs on US imports could have the biggest trade flow impact, backing out all of the US’s oil and gas exports to China – which made up just over 10% of total US exports to China in 2024. China’s reciprocal tariffs totalling 135% on oil and 140% on LNG will make importing from the US prohibitively expensive. LNG deliveries have been halted completely since early February (see Gas/Power), but oil and refined product cargoes loaded before April 10 and arriving in China before May 13 are expected to be exempt from the higher tariffs.
Chinese crude oil imports from the US Dec-24 to April-25 (kb/d)
| December | 216 |
| January | 189 |
| February | 71 |
| March | 133 |
Source: China General Administration of Customs
US crude oil flows to China are relatively small and already began slowing in February and March (see table 2), according to the latest China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC) data.10 Remaining crude flows from the US are likely to fall sharply in April and possibly cease altogether by May under the 135% tariffs. China can easily replace US crudes with other grades, most probably from the Middle East as OPEC quotas are relaxed. China has been reducing purchases of US crude in recent years, with average annual flows dropping to 152,000 b/d/190,000 b/d in 2024 from 282,000 b/d in 2023, according to Platts quoting GAC data.
Alternative crude inflows declared as Malaysian origin, which may also reportedly include some sanctioned Iranian and Venezuelan barrels, reached an all-time high of 2.03mn b/d in March, according to GAC data – well above Malaysia’s total production – as buyers rushed to get cargoes delivered before tougher US sanctions kicked in. Early signs for April suggest Chinese refiners have boosted crude imports generally, as they often do during periods of low prices.
Asia’s other regular US crude buyers are keen to snap up the displaced US flows and are making enquiries – partly to placate the US and to improve trade balances before the 90-day pause on Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs is over. Buyers could also see discounts on US barrels in the Asian market as they are backed out of China, according to Platts in early April. Potential alternative customers include refiners and traders in Japan, Thailand, South Korea, India, Vietnam and Singapore.
South Korea was the top buyer of US crude in Asia in 2024, importing 168mn barrels, which represents an 18.3% increase from 2023 according KNOC data reported in Platts. In India, Bharat Petroleum recently secured a short-term contract to procure 1mn b/d of WTI Midland crude and indicated that it may purchase additional US cargoes from the spot market.
In Southeast Asia, Thailand’s state-run PTT said firming Mideast Gulf prices meant US grades were looking more attractive, especially if further discounts can be obtained on cargoes that had been destined for China. Thailand was Asia’s fifth-largest buyer of US crude in 2024, purchasing 40.21mn barrels, up 4.9% on 2023, according to Platts.
However, uncertainties over economic growth and trade resulting from US tariffs has reduced demand among Asian refiners for crude spot purchases generally. Weak demand could make reselling US cargoes more difficult, putting downward pressure on differentials and dampening the appetite for term deals.
Big impact for China’s petrochemical feedstock imports from US
Far more significant than the impact on crude is the effect tariffs will have on China’s substantial imports of petrochemical feedstocks, LPG and ethane, from the US – with current Chinese tariffs likely to halt shipments.
US exporters have expanded sales as production from shale drilling has grown, with US LPG production (propane and butane) at 4.1mn b/d and ethane production 2.8mn b/d in 2024, according Reuters quoting the US EIA.11 China is the biggest overseas buyer of US petrochemical feedstock, and the US is China’s biggest supplier, with major importers including Chinese petrochemical JVs with Saudi Aramco and ExxonMobil.
US exporters have become highly reliant on Chinese demand, while Chinese petrochemical producers also depend on US supplies, especially ethane. Ethane is prized over alternatives such as naphtha as it produces far more ethylene and is not easily sourced from elsewhere in large quantities.
China accounted for 27% of US LPG exports in 2024 – or about 580,000 b/d – while China’s reliance on US propane increased to 59.2% in 2024. This February, Chinese LPG imports of US origin rose to a record 59.5% of total LPG inflows as buyers rushed to stock up with US product before tariffs took effect, according to GAC data March 20. Conversely, Middle Eastern suppliers, traditionally key sources, saw their share of Chinese LPG imports drop 18.4% to 36.7% in February.
This is likely to reverse as Chinese buyers are likely to turn to Middle Eastern suppliers to replace US cargoes from March onwards, and their share is expected to rise significantly over coming months. This could push up prices for Middle Eastern and other alternative non-US LPG/propane and butane suppliers. At the same time, US Gulf Coast propane prices have shown weakness in recent trading, according to Platts, as Chinese demand disappears.
Ethane squeeze
China imported 5.51mn mt of ethane from the US in 2024 (190,000 b/d), up from 4.64mn mt in 2023 – accounting for 62% of all Chinese ethane imports in 2024, while China accounts for about half of US exports, according to the US EIA.12 Ethane imports from the US were expected to increase sharply this year and will be harder for China to replace than LPG, while the US may also have trouble finding alternative buyers for displaced cargoes.
Ethane users are understood to be pressuring the Chinese government for a tariff exemption as alternatives are very limited. Another option is to switch to naphtha, which is easier to source from the Mideast and elsewhere.
However, ethane gives China’s petrochemical plants a competitive advantage and any disruption in supply could mean some plants cutting operating rates or even halting operations, reducing ethylene production, with Platts reporting an average run rate of 67% on April 10, down about 5 percentage points on the week. Limited supplies elsewhere mean not all ethane imports are likely to be replaced, and attempts may be made to import US feedstock via third countries to avoid the sanctions.
Chinese term lifters of both fuels are likely to attempt to resell deliveries to buyers outside China, which could lead to discounts for US material. Chinese LPG and ethane importers may also seek swap deals with buyers of cargoes from the Middle East, Algeria and other regions, as they did during earlier US tariffs under Trump’s first term. This could push the price of alternative sources up further and put more downward pressure on US cargo prices.
Discounted US cargoes are likely to find new buyers in Europe and elsewhere. Buyers in Taiwan, India and Thailand are also thought to be keen to import more US ethane and LPG to improve trade balances with the US in the run up to Trump’s 90-day tariff review in July.
There are also impacts on the global trade in solar panels, EVs, batteries, wind turbines and other renewable energy technologies from tariffs on Chinese goods, including in the EU as well as the US, while Chinese bans on the export of key rare earth metals could temporarily affect the development of some green tech manufacturing outside China. This will be covered in more detail elsewhere.
Iranian crude to China
So far, tighter US sanctions under President Trump have had little impact on Iranian crude production or exports, although this could change over coming months. Iran’s oil production increased by 12,000 b/d in March, the third monthly rise in a row – reaching 3.335mn b/d, according to OPEC estimates.13
A large slice of this goes to China’s independent refineries, which imported a record volume of 8.07mn mt (1.91mn b/d) in March, according to Platts data.14 This was 12% above the previous high of 1.71mn b/d in August 2024 and up 19.5% on February’s six-month peak of 1.6mn b/d. A record 1.5mn b/d of the March crude deliveries were loaded on US-sanctioned tankers.
This flow may fall quickly over coming months as further sanctions are applied by the Trump administration, which has promised a return of maximum pressure on the Iranian regime amid on-going nuclear negotiations, including sanctions on any companies found trading in or purchasing Iranian oil. However, China may push back against this now that a trade war is developing between the two.
The US is increasingly taking action, with sanctions imposed on April 16 on another Chinese independent refinery, Shandong Shengxing Chemical (SSC), for buying more than $1bn worth of Iranian crude. The US also sanctioned five tankers and their owners that received Iranian oil via ship-to-ship transfers in early 2025.
Additional sanctions announced in April, including on SSC, could have some impact on trade between Iran and China given the significant sums involved. However, China is unlikely to voluntarily end purchases, and further progress on reducing Iranian exports may require sanctions on those involved in ship-to-ship transfers in Malay and Indonesian waters, along with Chinese port companies and banks, according to S&P Global.
In response, the Chinese government has instructed independent refineries to develop contingency plans to ensure continued operations in the event they are placed on the US sanctions list. The government said it would assist in coordinating operational issues between refineries and their ecosystems, including banking services, as needed amid sanctions – effectively supporting the behaviour.
Upheaval in shipping
The raft of tariffs and sanctions and their impact on trade and energy demand – along with uncertainty over their duration – has thrown global shipping markets into turmoil, with routes increasingly determined by restrictive trade measures rather than traditional supply-demand fundamentals – meaning longer routes on the one hand, and a potential softening of demand in some areas on the other.
The net impact on tanker rates appears to have been slightly negative, at least initially, with escalating trade tensions and new US tariff threats outweighing the extra miles from longer routes – although uncertainty has left many rates little changed. Platts reported that its very large crude carrier (VLCC) assessment index fell 6% from the start of the month to $34,677/d April 16, with container and dry bulk vessels falling more steeply.
The biggest impact may be from significant penalties on Chinese flagged vessels, which Trump plans to apply when they visit the US.
Penalties on Chinese shipping
President Trump is planning to place significant fees on all Chinese built or flagged vessels entering the US in order to increase demand for US built vessels and revitalize the US shipbuilding industry, although there don’t appear to be any plans to invest in shipyards, or recruit and train staff. The US currently builds around five commercial ships a year, while China builds more than 1,000. US vessels are also currently more expensive to make and operate than Asian-made vessels.
The Trump administration proposal unveiled in February would levy fees on Chinese-operated ships that access US ports, and further charges on operators with high proportions of Chinese vessels in their fleets and future ship orders pending with Chinese shipyards.15 If the ship was built in China, the operator would pay up to $1mn per docking. This could increase to $1.5mn if the fleet that the ship belongs to includes other Chinese vessels. These are maximum figures, with the fee calculated based on net tonnage per voyage into the US.
China dominates the ship building market alongside Korea and Japan. As of 2023, China accounted for 51%, South Korea and Japan 43% and the US 0.1% of the world’s 64.8 million gross tons of global shipbuilding tonnage, according to the United Nations Trade and Development report.16 China is similarly dominant in the energy sector with a roughly 50% share of the LPG tanker market and just over a third of the LNG market.
Reports suggest US producers, exporters, and importers across commodities believe that the proposed port fees will be extremely damaging to business and could prompt shippers to limit US dockings and divert ships to Canada and Mexico without spurring more US shipbuilding.17
The fees could make US oil and gas exports less competitive and hit upstream margins, slowing production. In 2024, the US exported 10.757mn b/d, most of which went in Chinese made tankers. In the global fleet of 8,883 tankers, 64 are US-flagged, or 0.7%. Costs would have to be passed down to consumers or the business would be lost, while ports in neighbouring countries are likely to see a boost in transit deliveries. The US also exported 13 bn cf3 of gas at LNG in 2024 often using Chinese LNG carriers. US-produced ethylene derivatives are exported as plastic pellets in container ships, which would also be hit.
The burden of the penalties is expected to fall primarily on US producers, manufacturers, and consumers rather than China or other countries. While the plans are currently underway, there is the potential for compromise or a watering down of suggested measures. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told the US Senate Finance Committee April 8 that not all of the proposed fees will be implemented, and they may not be imposed on top of one another.
The proposed fees also would require more exports to exit the US on US-built and US-flagged vessels, reaching 15% in seven years. However, it may take far longer than this to rejuvenate the US shipbuilding sector, and even longer to replace overseas vessels in shipping fleets, with no US shipyards currently able to build LNG carriers or the largest container ships. China also dominates the supply of most major equipment used at worldwide ports.
It is likely to prove difficult to switch to non-Chinese vessels given their predominance, and the fleet rules are even more difficult to remedy. Given the US low share of shipbuilding, it may take many years to train the required workforce and expand the sector sufficiently to provide alternatives. Even then, they are likely to be more expensive, which could make US exports less competitive and US imports more expensive – a similar impact to the penalties on non-US vessels.
References
1. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2025/04/22/world-economic-outlook-april-2025
3. https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/woodside-energy-warns-tariffs-could-081930595.html
4. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/business/alaska-lng-japan-south-korea.html
5.https://www.woodmac.com/blogs/the-edge/tariffs-implications-for-oil-and-gas/
6. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo
8. https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/030425-enbridge-eyes-300000-bd-expansion-of-canadian-mainline-crude-pipeline
10. http://english.customs.gov.cn/Statistics/Statistics?ColumnId=1
12. https://www.bairdmaritime.com/shipping/gas/feature-in-drive-to-cut-costs-chinas-us-ethane-imports-to-surge-in-2025
13. https://www.opec.org/monthly-oil-market-report.html
14. https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/040325-us-sanctions-may-cut-iranian-crude-imports-by-chinas-independent-refineries-in-april
15. https://www.msn.com/en-gb/money/other/trump-administration-announces-fees-on-chinese-built-vessels-at-us-ports/
16. https://unctad.org/publication/trade-and-development-report-2024